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There has been a remarkable uptake in the deployment of digital technologies in elections 
over the last two decades – a trend that is clearest in Africa and Asia. In Africa roughly half of 
all national level elections now involve digital equipment of some form, most notably 
biometric voter registration/identification and electronic results transmission.1 The stated 
driver for this has been similar everywhere: in circumstances where elections are problematic 
– because of malpractice, or procedural problems, or both – digital technology is seen as a 
fix, able to compensate for the weakness of the state and to deter malpractice by politicians 
and officials. The hope is that new technology will enhance the electoral environment in three 
main ways: by making the functioning of the electoral commission more robust and efficient, 
by reducing the scope for electoral manipulation, and by generating greater clarity and 
transparency regarding election outcomes. On this basis, the proponents of new technology 
also expect it to boost the process’s legitimacy – and hence that of the elected government. 
Yet, while there are clearly cases in which such technologies guard against malpractice 
and boost public confidence in the short-term, there are also examples in which they prove 
to be ineffective. Recent experience suggests that such technology relies on complex 
procedures that are liable to breakdown, may actually increase popular suspicion of 
manipulation, and encourage complacency towards traditional forms of election oversight. 
Given this, when considering which types of digitization are worth the cost, it is important 
that greater attention is paid to the limitations and unintended consequences of new 
electoral technology. 
Digital technologies can of course be used in many ways in elections, including new 
communication technologies such as Whatsapp. However, our focus is solely on the digital 
technologies deployed by electoral commissions: those associated with electronic voter 
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registration, voter verification, and results transmission. We are not the first researchers to 
question the rush to these new ways of running elections. A number of papers by 
practitioners have been published in this area, including two edited collections. The first, 
curated by Michael Yard of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 
addresses the “progress and pitfalls” of new technology deployed by state electoral 
commissions.2 In particular, Yard helpfully distinguishes electoral efficiency from electoral 
transparency and argues that while technology can help to achieve both goals, it tends to be 
implemented in a way that promotes the former over the latter. By creating “black box” 
components that “lead to more efficient development and employment”, he argues, new 
technology risks transferring power “away from the many” into the “hands of the few”.3 
A second collection edited by Astrid Evrensel echoes many of Yard’s points, while also 
emphasising the “organization and logistical challenges” that new technology can generate.4 
The analysis of Evrensel and her colleagues is particularly significant because it highlights the 
heavy dependence of electoral commissions on the support and expertise provided by the 
international community, who often help to both fund and procure digital equipment. As 
Akumiah notes with reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this raises serious 
questions about the long-term sustainability of the “digital revolution”.5 
A number of other publications have identified similar challenges. Joel Barkan argues 
that new technology in Africa often fails because insufficient attention is paid to the broader 
management structures it needs to function.6 In other contexts, studies have questioned the 
cost of digital solutions and highlighted how automation can improve the efficiency of one 
aspect of the electoral process7 but leave other major issues, such as voter intimidation, 
unaddressed.8 Worse still, digital technology can encourage a narrow focus on particular 
parts of the electoral process to the neglect of the broader political environment and 
campaigns – a point acknowledged even by some enthusiasts.9  
We build on these existing discussions to develop our own critique. More specifically, 
we draw on Yard’s discussion of the “undemocratic” elements of election technology to 
demonstrate how the complex science that underpins digital processes can render elections 
less transparent, and follow Evrensel and Akumiah in stressing the international dimension of 
the spread of new technology.10 However, we also seek to go beyond these studies in three 
important ways. First, the analysis contained in Yard and Evrensel’s collections is now seven 
years old, and so does not cover the recent wider rush to digital technology. As a result, these 
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authors did not focus on the central question animating our analysis: why has the spread of 
digital technology gathered pace at the same time that evidence of its limitations has become 
ever more apparent? By bringing the story up-to-date, we are able to advance a new 
explanation of these contradictory trends.  
Our second contribution is to refocus the debate on the political, rather than the 
logistical, barriers to the effective deployment of new technology. While some important 
journal articles have been published more recently – such as Piccolino’s analysis of Cote 
d’Ivoire and Ghana and Debos’ work on Chad11 – they have tended to adopt a relatively 
narrow focus, addressing a particular aspect of the electoral process in one or two cases. At 
the same time, the wider literature has mainly focused on procedural challenges, paying less 
attention to the political context within which technology is introduced. By contrast, we seek 
to place political factors centre-stage, considering how the quality of democracy and the 
independence of the electoral commission impacts on the performance of new technologies. 
Unsurprisingly, we find that the greatest gains from digitization come in countries where the 
quality of democracy is higher and the electoral commission more independent. This is 
significant, because it implies that new technology is likely to be least effective where it is 
most needed. As John Githongo, Kenya’s former anti-corruption tsar, put it: “you cannot 
digitize integrity”.12 
The third contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how new technology may have 
damaging effects even when it generates procedural improvements in the way that elections 
are run. While Yard pointed to the way that election technology can empower a small 
technocratic elite, and Gonggrijp and colleagues have found that digital processes may 
become a source of mistrust,13 neither fully explores the way in which this can undermine 
domestic and international confidence in electoral outcomes. 
 Investigating the effectiveness of new technology is complicated by the fact that it is 
expected to achieve a number of different ends, and the difficulty of establishing criteria for 
judging whether an intervention has been “effective”. As an extensive literature has 
addressed issues of logistical capacity, we focus our efforts on the capacity of digital processes 
to render elections cleaner, more transparent, and hence legitimate. We draw on data from 
a wide range of sources, including election observation reports from around the world that 
typically feature evaluations of the performance of electoral commissions; public opinion 
surveys that provide insights into the attitudes of ordinary voters; the statements and 
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behaviours of elite actors that give a sense of the beliefs of political leaders; and, our direct 
experience of watching elections in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. These cases have 
been selected because they have very similar electoral systems, having been former British 
colonies, but vary considerably when it comes to the quality of democracy and electoral 
management, allowing us to investigate the impact of these factors on digital processes. 
Instead of specifying an arbitrary threshold for ‘effectiveness’, we ask whether there was 
meaningful improvement – i.e. changes in the logistical management and transparency of the 
process that were sufficient to impact on the overall quality of the elections – and whether 
this can be attributed to the use of new technology. Focussing on improvement over time at 
the country level has the advantage of accounting for the conditions on the ground in each 
case, rather than seeking to impose an ideal standard.  
We build our argument in five stages. The first section discusses the drivers of new 
technology. In particular, we highlight two issues that have yet to be fully addressed in the 
literature: the tendency of a range of influential actors to fetishize digitization technology, 
and the way in which the high cost of new technology generates rent-seeking opportunities, 
which in turn help to explain its popularity. In the second section, we draw attention to 
another aspect of the ‘digital fallacy’: the widespread belief that technologies will resolve 
logistical challenges and promote electoral quality and transparency. Finally, we identify a 
further unintended consequence of the introduction of digital technology that is often 
overlooked; namely, that it tends to distract opposition parties from focusing on effectively 
deploying party agents and leads to funds being directed away from the provision of domestic 
monitors, leaving other parts of the system more vulnerable – especially if digital processes 
break down. By evaluating new technology in terms of the “opportunity cost” that it 
represents, we highlight its true implications. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in this article suggests that, while digitization 
may be unstoppable, its impact in the world’s new democracies is likely to be mixed. In more 
democratic contexts such as Ghana, new technology has realised some of the gains advertised 
by its proponents. But in the more difficult cases such as Kenya, where compromised electoral 
commissions operate in semi-authoritarian contexts, the introduction of new technology has 
generated few benefits. This is not to say that digital technology is always to blame for 
electoral controversies. In many of the cases we cover, elections would probably not have 
been significantly better in the absence of digitization. But digital electoral technologies are 
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expensive: they must deliver real benefits to be worth that cost. Given this, their adoption 
needs to be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. At present, digitization is being 
pursued in many countries that lack the political will and institutional framework necessary 
for it to function effectively. 
 
 
Explaining the digitization drive: fetishization and rent seeking 
 
National elections by secret ballot and adult suffrage necessarily involve the processual 
combination of particular techniques, and devices – from the pens and indelible ink used to 
mark ballot papers and voters’ fingers to voter identification cards and ballot papers:14 what 
we have elsewhere called the “voting machine”. 15  Elections have thus always involved 
technological innovation of a sort, and non-digital technologies were novel to many of those 
who organized and participated in the electoral process when it was first introduced. 
However, in recent decades the equipment used during elections has become increasingly hi-
tech. Biometric registration records voters’ fingerprints, faces and/or other bio-data; 
biometric identification verifies this data electronically at the polling station to clear an 
individual to vote; and, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) 
and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) systems offer alternative technologies for recording 
voter choice. Finally, there are electronic systems – often based on mobile phone applications 
– for counting and collating votes.  
Latin America led the way in many of these innovations; beginning with a 
“computerized voting pilot” in Colombia in 1992, soon followed by a computerized 
registration system linked to a photographic identification card with a barcode.16 In 1998, 
voters in Brazil cast their ballots via “computers connected to a secure local area network”. 
Subsequently, Venezuela introduced the scanning of ballots and electronic transmission of 
results. 17  The accelerating spread of these technologies to other parts of the world – 
particularly Asia and sub-Saharan Africa – has had multiple drivers. Civil society groups and 
opposition parties, bilateral and international agencies for electoral support, electoral 
management bodies and incumbent regimes have all supported this trend – indeed, 
sometimes they have demanded new technologies. The motives of these groups are varied, 
and have included the fact that similar developments have helped to strengthen potentially 
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vulnerable electoral systems in important “test cases”, such as India. Voting has been 
conducted electronically in the world’s largest democracy since 1999, and although concerns 
remain that these machines are vulnerable to hacking,18 some commentators have credited 
them with increasing public confidence in the electoral process.19 However, it is also true that 
popular and policy debates about digitization tend to share another consistent element: all 
involve a degree of fetishization, crediting technologies “with powers they do not have (e.g., 
the ability to solve social problems, to keep the economy vibrant, or to provide us with a 
superior life)”.20 
The “biometrics revolution”, as enthusiasts call it, promises developmental 
transformation.21 The websites of companies that market these technologies foreground this 
fetishization, imputing to their devices an innate power that transcends politics and human 
agency. Their self-presentation emphasizes modernity, offering “clear processes, supported 
by state-of-the-art technology”.22  They rhetorically lament the backwards state of many 
electoral processes and worry that “[t]echnology has revolutionized so many aspects of our 
lives – services, lifestyles and living standards but elections have been left behind”.23 These 
narratives cast digital technologies as “anti-politics” machines, providing simple technical 
solutions to complex social and political problems.24  For the public and civil society, the 
technology companies promise to enable “citizens to access services and exercise their rights 
securely and easily”, and for governments and electoral management bodies they offer a 
vision of panoptical modern stateness: “helping governments manage the civil identity cycle 
in the increasingly mobile and globalized world of the 21st century”.25 For international or 
bilateral agencies, meanwhile, technologies provide a way to channel electoral support 
towards procedural issues that may allow them to avoid accusation of partisanship and neo-
colonialism.26 
Some visions of the modern are, straightforwardly, marketing strategies by 
technology companies. For example, one major player in the field has sponsored an 
“International Elections Advisory Council”, composed of retired national election officials, to 
promote the idea that digital technology offers a ready solution to electoral challenges. In 
one of the Council’s publications, a former South African electoral commissioner describes 
how digital technologies “leapfrogged [voting] to the brink of the twenty-first century”.27  
As self-serving as such strategies may be, these companies are exploiting wider 
attitudes, not creating them. Indeed, it is important not to understate the allure of new 
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technologies of identification for the citizen, for whom biometric voters’ cards and the like 
offer a way to make claims on the state or to renegotiate social status.28 Mobile phones have 
created new economic and social opportunities in countries around the world – it is not 
surprising that many voters believe that similar technology can have a transformative impact 
on elections. As one elections expert who has worked for international observation missions 
in over fifteen countries put it: 
  
“… you get this almost blind faith that technology will make everything better, even 
though it can be extremely difficult to introduce … it is almost as if there is a 
suspension of disbelief because donors and opposition leaders are so desperate for 
something – anything – to fix the process”.29 
 
This confidence often extends to the mass public. In Kenya, for example, a nationally 
representative survey conducted by Ipsos in early October 2017 found that 58% of 
respondents agreed that “Elections that use digital technology are always more free and fair” 
(emphasis added). This is despite the fact that, as we shall see, the widespread use of digital 
technology in the presidential poll of 8 August 2017 did not prevent it from being found to be 
“illegal, null and void” by the Supreme Court. In other words, the effectiveness of the kind of 
marketing described above reflects the wider appeal of digital technologies and the persistent 
power of modernity; in one study in the US, voters expressed a preference for new voting 
technologies in the (un-evidenced) belief that they were more robust.30  
This process is not unique, nor disconnected from other developmental trends, but 
rather reflects a much broader tendency to overlook the potential limitations of new 
technology when it comes to transforming lives in the global south – and, indeed, the global 
north. As David Harvey has argued, “[a]ll manner of social actors (corporations, 
entrepreneurs, and various branches of government, most particularly the military) endow 
technology with causative powers to the point that they will uncritically—and sometimes 
disastrously—invest in it in the naive belief that it will somehow provide solutions to whatever 
problems they are encountering”.31 In a sense, this argument is an extension of James Scott’s 
famous critique of high modernism, as a “form of modernity, characterized by an unfaltering 
confidence in science and technology as means to reorder the social and natural world”.32  
Scott argues that seeing the world through this lens is deeply problematic because placing 
 8 
too much confidence in new scientific discoveries means that the potential flaws in 
technology are not detected, leading to developmental disasters.  
Recent research has often echoed this analysis. Writing about the World Summit on 
Information Technology, an event supported by the United Nations General Assembly in 2003 
and 2005 that involved 50 heads of state/government and vice-presidents,33 Marc Raboy 
records that the days leading up the event “were marked by almost surrealist fetishization of 
technology”.34  Similarly, Shahid Alv, discussing the use of technology in education, urges 
caution and argues that the importance of local context is too often “ignored or downplayed 
in the rush to fetishize technology”.35  Moving back to the realm of elections, the great 
confidence placed in digitization means that the successes of new technology have often been 
championed while its failures are overlooked. As a well-travelled elections expert who has 
worked for IFES – a company that often advises electoral commissions on these processes – 
put it: 
 
“You go to so many countries where everyone has this incredible confidence in the 
potential of technology … even when the ruling party has no interest in free and fair 
elections. It makes you want to shout … ‘just digitizing things is not going to save you’ 
… and it is going to cost a lot [of money].”36  
 
In Ghana, biometric registration and identification were introduced for elections in 
2012. In the context of chronic complaints over the accuracy of the voting register, the 
combined system of registration and verification was presented as a qualified success.37 In 
practice, however, there were multiple problems, most notably that in some cases 
verification devices failed to identify individuals’ thumbprints, or failed entirely.38 Subsequent 
research indicated that machines were more likely to fail where no observers were present, 
and that machine failure was correlated with over-voting.39 These anomalies did not become 
major issues partly because another, more pressing issue of credibility arose – over vote-
tallying and recording40 – distracting attention from them. Despite this uncertain experience, 
neither candidates nor officials (nor the donors who had supported their introduction) 
questioned the inherent value of digital technologies.41 Indeed, one politician explicitly saw 
this as a step on the way to even more technology – an understanding apparently linked to a 
mistaken belief regarding how European elections are run: 
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… we are only praying that a day may come when we will do e-voting. Not e-
transmission but e-voting. I was in UK … you put your card there it makes a sound, 
nobody, there’s no agent, nobody is there at the polling centre.42 
 
In describing this attachment to technology as fetishization, we do not mean to 
understate the genuine potential of digital technologies. Where voters’ rolls have been 
bloated by multiple registration, biometric registration may significantly reduce them. Where 
the presence of large numbers of ‘ghost’ voters – deceased, or moved elsewhere – has 
created space for rigging through impersonation, biometric voter identification can provide 
an effective check on fraud. As the Commonwealth Observer Group opined after Nigeria’s 
2015 elections: “… the introduction of biometric Permanent Voter Cards is, in our view, a 
major factor in enhancing the integrity of the electoral process”.43  
However, it is clear that the introduction of new technology cannot fully safeguard an 
election because some irregularities – such as gerrymandering, the intimidation of voters, and 
voter bribery – cannot be prevented by digitization.44 Moreover, even in the areas in which 
such technologies have the greatest transformative potential, they cannot do this work by 
themselves; rather, their efficacy is dependent on effective implementation. Biometric 
technology cannot prevent multiple registration if the data is not audited to prevent 
duplication, as was evidenced by widespread and reportedly flagrant biometric multiple 
registration in Somaliland in 2008.45 Similarly, an audit ahead of the 2011 elections in the DRC 
found 700,000 so-called “doublons” – multiple registrations – but officials ruled that “it was 
too late to clean up the roll”.46  
The potential for technology to be manipulated – or to simply break down – are rarely 
publicly admitted by those who seek to promote the its use. Yet stories along these lines are 
easy to find if you look for them. For example, while the peaceful transfer of power in the 
Nigerian polls of 2015 has been claimed as a triumph for digitization,47 many parts of the 
process did not function as intended. Most notably, 91 per cent of the machines failed to 
consistently verify voter identity in the presidential poll according to EU observers.48  Thus, in 
Nigeria, as in so many other cases, the public image of technology does not reflect the reality. 
 A deep faith in modernity is not the only driver of the digitization of elections. Those 
who are involved in the design and procurement of new technology may also have a more 
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cynical motivation: personal or corporate financial gain. The vast cost of new technology, and 
the fact that it involves purchasing large amounts of expensive equipment, makes it a classic 
target for rent-seeking activities. Given that digitization is often attempted in contexts in 
which there are often weak checks and balances against corrupt activity, it is unsurprising 
that it has often been accompanied by financial scandals involving multinational companies 
and host governments.  
 The cost of implementing biometric verification software is often particularly 
burdensome, because one kit needs to be purchased for each polling station. In Kenya in 2013 
the “total cost of all the computers, mobile phones, and accessory equipment” alone – not 
including the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission’s (IEBC) other operating costs 
– was estimated at US$120 million, or US$10 for each voter.49 Ahead of the DRC’s 2005 
election: “A staggering US$40,160,000 was needed to buy the 10,000 biometric registration 
kits and to have them transported … to Kinshasa.”50 Beyond the cost of the equipment itself, 
the need to distribute the machines around the country, and to pay for staff training and 
maintenance – in addition to the challenge of keeping equipment up-to-date – compounds 
the problem. Just four years after the initial procurement in Kenya, the IEBC purchased an 
entirely new “integrated electoral management system”, at a cost that is estimated to be over 
EUR 40 million. Biometric registration is usually cheaper, because a smaller number of kits 
can be used to cover a larger area, but is still costly. For example, the use of new technology 
raised the cost of the registration process to US$9 per person in Nigeria and US$20 per person 
in Afghanistan.51 
It is the high cost of election technology, and the fact that it tends to be introduced in 
poorer countries, that has made many new democracies increasingly dependent on 
international support to run elections, as argued by Evrensel and Akumiah. For example, 
when Somaliland acquired what was touted to be the most advanced voter registration and 
identification system in the world in 2016, this was only possible because international donors 
picked up the EUR 13.5 million bill – more than EUR 10 per voter.52 As the UN Secretary-
General bemoaned in 2009, “Some of the poorest countries in the world have chosen some 
of the most expensive electoral processes and technology. ... I am concerned about 
techniques and systems that might cause a State, in the conduct of its own elections, to be 
financially dependent on donors”.53 Moreover, this often generates a complex triangle of 
economic relations between the donors who finance new technology, the government or 
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electoral officials who procure it, and the international companies that provide it. In this set 
of relationships, donors can gain by using their leverage to ensure that key contracts go to 
businesses that operate in their jurisdiction, companies can gain by generating large profits, 
and officials can benefit by requiring kick-backs to process a contract.  
 As a result, going hi-tech can attract “a wave of profiteers”.54 In Kenya, the Canadian 
government offered to help secure the loans needed to pay for the introduction of digital 
equipment in 2013, but only if it was purchased from an approved company under Canadian 
supervision. This practice was highly controversial and following a review of election 
expenditure the Public Accounts Committee of the Kenyan parliament asked the Attorney 
General to institute proceedings to recover “Sh305 million from Canadian Commercial 
Corporation”55 that had been paid as a “brokerage fee” as part of this process.56 Similar issues 
have emerged in relation to the 2011 election in the DRC, after which a Belgium company, 
ZETES, was sued in Belgium for electoral fraud following claims of corruption during the 
procurement process of biometric voter registration kits.57  
It is important not to exaggerate the extent of this problem. Technology has been 
introduced in many countries without subsequent scandals. Nonetheless, it is important to 
recognize that in states with a history of corruption, some of the support for digitization may 
be disingenuous – motivated more by a desire to open up fresh rent-seeking opportunities 
than to improve the quality of elections. This point is significant for the ways in which 
elections play out for three reasons. First, problematic procurement processes can lead to 
poorly-qualified companies getting contracts that they are ill-equipped to fulfil.58  Second, 
faulty procurement processes often require the process to be conducted a second time, 
delaying the purchase of equipment so late that it cannot be effectively piloted. Third, 
corruption scandals that involve – or are believed to involve – electoral officials, can 
dramatically undermine public confidence in the broader electoral process, as in the cases of 
Kenya and the DRC described here.59   
 
 
The digital fallacy (1): more robust and better managed electoral processes 
 
One of the claims made for digital technology is that it can strengthen electoral processes in 
countries where state and electoral management bodies have limited capacities. But ensuring 
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that such technology is properly used is far from straight forward. On the one hand, it requires 
careful planning and complex logistics to ensure that data is inputted, staff are trained, and 
sufficient power is provided. Devices and servers must be tested and replacements have to 
be available if devices break down. Many of these challenges are also present when it comes 
to manual (paper) processes – but some are not. For example, if competitive procurement 
processes lead to a different company conducting voter registration than the company 
selected to provide the database to manage the electoral roll, it is essential to make sure that 
the two sets of software are compatible. In some cases this is not a major challenge, but in 
Malawi it took five months and considerable resources to achieve this, which left inadequate 
time to actually audit and clean the roll.60 On the other hand, technology requires many other 
forms of human input. Code has to be written for programmes; servers have to be protected; 
and, digital registers have to be maintained, cleaned, and kept secure. Such realities increase 
the cost of an election and render them increasingly complicated processes: although 
considerable work has been done to simplify the user interface for new equipment, additional 
timelines and training requirements, not greater simplicity, are often the corollaries of 
digitization.  
The weight of these logistical challenges means that things can and often do go wrong. 
For example, biometric registration or verification devices may not arrive in time, power cuts 
or insufficient battery life may stop them from working, and so on. The scale of these issues 
tends to vary at different points in the electoral cycle: as a rough rule, biometric registration 
has tended to work better than biometric verification, simply because the time pressure is so 
much more intense when millions of voters have to be processed in a single day. This was 
apparent in Chad in 2016, where the new register apparently eliminated much double 
registration, but actual voting was still chaotic.61 In Kenya’s 2013 elections, a new biometric 
registration process worked relatively well, delivering a register that appears to have been 
more transparent than any previous one.62  
However, attempts to use this register for verification were very far from a success. 
Electronic voter identification kits failed at some point during the day in over half of the 
country’s polling stations,63 and polling staff reverted to manual registers. In turn, this process 
was complicated by a greater degree of uncertainty over what the definitive register actually 
was, since printed versions differed slightly. A new electronic results transmission system – 
another innovation that had not been tested or scrutinised – failed even more 
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comprehensively.64 Early result transmissions recorded a remarkably high number of rejected 
ballots; it was then announced that the system had multiplied the number of rejected ballots 
by eight, though how and why has never been explained. Then, following an initial stream of 
results, the flow of information ground to a halt. It later transpired that a server failure had 
meant that the system could not cope with the “volume of data that was being 
transmitted”.65 A lack of time to test the system, and the failure to provide a backup, had 
undermined one of the core reforms designed to protect electoral integrity following the 
disputed election of 2007. These problems were subsequently blamed on the IEBC’s 
“evermore compressed timelines” and lack of “sufficiently thorough preparation”.66  
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the quality of the 2013 Kenya election 
– in terms of how “manipulated” it was – would have been significantly better if digital 
technology had not been used. The IEBC operated a manual back up – i.e. the traditional 
method for running an election – that kicked in when the technology failed, and argued that 
it performed well. The Supreme Court agreed, upholding the result. But even if the manual 
process did hold up – something that remains controversial – it is clear that new technology 
generated significant negative outcomes. First, the collapse of digital processes undermined 
the confidence of opposition supporters and many neutral commentators in the election, 
despite the findings of the Supreme Court. Second, the vast cost of the technology led to few 
improvements, but took money away from other potential investments, a point that we 
explore in greater detail below.  
The technological failures in Kenya’s 2013 elections were particularly high profile, but 
not unusual. In addition to the problems with the biometric kits already noted in Nigeria, 
there were also significant problems with the collation system. According to EU observers, 
the electronic transmission of results from state-level collation centres to the presidential 
returning officer via email represented the weakest part of the process.67 These issues are 
not necessarily fatal. Polling staff can learn quickly and some of the problems noted in Nigeria 
were significantly reduced in the gubernatorial elections that followed two weeks later.68 But 
it is nevertheless important to recognize that the introduction of digital technology cannot 
resolve the problem of weak states and electoral commissions precisely because effective 
implementation requires a strong and flexible administrative structure in the first place. 
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The digital fallacy (2): more transparent and clean elections 
 
Another claim made of digitization is that it can generate cleaner polls. While this may be true 
in a limited sense, it is clear that many kinds of electoral manipulation defy control by digital 
technologies: as Marielle Debos has pointed out in the case of Chad, biometric technology 
‘raised hopes, but did not radically change the rules of the political game’. 69  Schedler’s 
famous “menu of manipulation” offers dishes that are served long before biometric 
registration/identification becomes relevant, and the advantages of incumbency are not 
necessarily diminished by biometry.70  For example, in the world’s electoral-authoritarian 
regimes, governments often outspend, intimidate, displace and generally disadvantage their 
opponents, and many of these strategies are unaffected by whether or not voter 
identification is controlled by fingerprint, retinal scan or digital photograph.  
 In this sense, digitization may improve the quality of some aspects of an electoral 
process without actually generating an election that comes close to being credible. Uganda’s 
2016 elections exemplify this: voters were registered biometrically, and their identities 
verified. Both processes were generally successful; so too was a donor-funded system that 
allowed some voters to confirm their registration and identify polling stations. But the 
election was marked by gross disparities, with the ruling National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) able to spend much more, while opposition leader Kizza Besigye’s efforts were 
hampered by his arrest and the intimidation of his supporters. Moreover, the results revealed 
implausibly high turnouts in NRM strongholds.71  Digital technologies neither levelled the 
playing field, nor boosted opposition confidence. 
Unsurprisingly, problematic outcomes have been recorded in other authoritarian 
contexts. For example, the case of Azerbaijan offers an apparently unintentional, and comic, 
insight on the ability of ruling parties to turn election technology to their own ends. In 2013, 
the credibility of a mobile phone app purportedly designed to communicate results was fatally 
undermined when it released the figures a day before a single ballot had been cast.72 Nor is 
this the only example of a case in which the introduction of technology has been manipulated 
for partisan gain. In Mozambique in 2014, the regime turned biometric registration into a 
technique of manipulation, suppressing registration in opposition areas by sending 
inadequate equipment and undertrained teams.73 
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But what of countries in which elections are held in contexts that are neither fully 
democratic, nor as controlled by the ruling party as they are in Azerbaijan and Uganda? The 
way in which the political context shapes the impact of new technologies is well illustrated by 
a comparison between Ghana and Kenya. When Kenya first introduced biometric technology 
in 2013 the country had held four multiparty elections but remained very much a 
“competitive-authoritarian”74 state in which the government retained effective control over 
a political system that Freedom House ranked as only “Partly Free”. Against this backdrop, 
successive electoral commissions have been criticised for being subject to direct political 
manipulation by the government.75 Following intense criticism of the ECK’s performance in 
the wake of the 2007 election controversy, which triggered ethnic clashes that led to the 
death of over 1,000 people, it was disbanded and replaced by the IEBC.  
By contrast, when Ghana began to digitize its electoral process in 2012 it had already 
emerged as one of the continent’s leading democratic lights and was rated as “Free” by 
Freedom House. This process was partly driven by, and in turn contributed to, the emergence 
of a particularly assertive and independent electoral commission under the leadership of its 
widely respected chair, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan. Not only did the Commission introduce reforms, 
such as transparent ballot boxes, which boosted public confidence, but the fact that Afari-
Gyan presided over transfers of power that brought both major parties to power also meant 
that he was seen to be politically neutral.76 
These different contexts are critical to understanding the greater success of the 
introduction of new technology in Ghana as compared to Kenya. As we have seen, digital 
technology did not perform well in the Ghanaian election of 2012. However, the Commission 
subsequently worked to improve its protocols, providing additional training and introducing 
measures to allow those not recognized by the kits to vote in other ways. In some instances, 
this work was driven by the initiative of electoral officials determined to rebuild their 
reputation. In other cases, it was mandated by the courts following pressure from opposition 
parties and civil society groups operating in a relatively open political landscape.77 As a result, 
far fewer problems were recorded with the performance of digital technology in the 2016 
general elections, with no complaint logged by either party – in contrast to 2012. In turn, this 
helped to boost public confidence in the result, despite the fact that, in-between the two 
polls, Afari-Gyan had stood down and been replaced by a less-trusted and tested chair (see 
below).78 
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In Kenya, the period between 2013 and 2017 also saw many changes, but these did 
not lead to the meaningful improvement witnessed in Ghana. Following the problems of 
2013, the opposition demanded that the IEBC be required to use new and improved digital 
systems for voter identification without the possibility of any manual back-up for the next 
election.79 In 2016, the law was amended to this effect, but this was subsequently reversed 
to allow a ‘complementary’ manual system at the insistence of the ruling party. 80  The 
opposition protested furiously, but unsuccessfully: as one prominent politician put it ‘[w]e 
wanted technology to ensure ourselves of credible polls’.81 The 2017 elections did, however, 
feature brand new technology in the shape of the Kenyan Integrated Electoral Management 
System, or KIEMS, kits. This system, supplied by the French firm OT Morpho – in a 
procurement process that raised questions due to the absence of a competitive process – 
allowed electoral officials to use the same piece of equipment to biometrically verify voters 
and then to transmit the results both as a typed in number and as a digital image of the official 
results form signed by electoral officials and party agents.82 The logic of having two forms of 
digital results – and three overall – was that each would act as a check on the other.  
Right up to the elections, held in August 2017, the opposition maintained their faith 
in digital technology,83 and public confidence also remained high: ‘the gadgets should work 
flawlessly and the elections should be free and fair’, declared one optimistic voter.84 Indeed, 
initial indications suggested that the new model had performed well. In stark contrast to 
2013, the domestic monitoring team found that KIEMS kits were present in 97% of polling 
stations and worked in 92% of those. Moreover, results quickly began to flow in to the online 
system, which was connected to a new – and impressive – website that allowed citizens to 
search results to the polling station level. However, as more information about the election 
began to trickle out, it transpired that some parts of the system had not been strengthened. 
Most notably, around a quarter of the scanned forms were not transmitted and made 
available by the time that the election result was announced. It also transpired that the 
passwords of senior election officials were used to access the system thousands of times – 
potentially by different people. Taken together with the refusal of the IEBC to provide 
information and access to its servers and other unexplained events – most notably, the 
murder of Chris Msando, the IEBC’s acting heading of information technology less than a week 
before the polls 85  – compounded issues of limited transparency and were enough to 
undermine the credibility of the election. Although the Court did not determine whether the 
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president received less votes than his rivals, a majority of judges ruled that the procedural 
limitations of the election – many of them digital – were sufficient to render it illegal.  
It is still not clear exactly what happened in the weeks leading up to the polls to 
generate this outcome, but statements from key players suggest that once again procedural 
improvements had been undermined by political interference. Following the nullification of 
the presidential election, first one of the Commissioners, Roselyn Akombe, and later the Chair 
of the Commission, Wafula Chebukati, broke ranks to complain that essential reforms were 
being blocked as a result of direct government interference in the inner workings of the 
electoral body.86  
We therefore have strong evidence that the comparatively successful bedding-in of 
digital election technology in Ghana and the continued failure of technology to generate 
credible elections in Kenya are rooted – if not fully explained – in variations in the quality of 
democracy and the political independence of the electoral management body. As Cheeseman 
and Klaas have argued, when electoral commissions operate under the influence of the ruling 
party, ‘making the most of new technology will require it to be transferred into the hands of 
independent civil society groups and opposition parties’87 – a point to which we return below. 
The Kenyan case is also instructive because it highlights the way in which the opaque 
nature of digital technologies may undermine public confidence in electoral processes even 
when they generate considerable improvements. When opposition leaders rejected the 
official results in August 2017, they did not just suggest that there had been a number of 
specific problems; rather, they alleged that the digital system had facilitated rigging, that the 
whole system had been hacked, and that all of the results were ‘computer-generated’.88 This 
accusation resonated with opposition supporters, whose confidence in elections had been 
eroded by past experience and recent events, including Msando’s murder and questions over 
the IEBC’s procurement processes. At the same time, the limited knowledge of many citizens 
and commentators regarding how digital processes actually work meant that it was extremely 
difficult to differentiate false claims from plausible ones. This was revealed in comical fashion 
when the opposition claimed to have a print-out of the log of activity on the IEBC’s servers 
and distributed it at a press conference only for none of the media, analysts and observers 
present to have the skills necessary to be able to tell if it was genuine. 89   
It later transpired that the data could not substantiate the claim of hacking (which is 
not to say that it did not occur), but this was long after reports of the accusation had been 
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circulated. Unsurprisingly, ordinary citizens were no more confident that they knew what was 
going on than those employed to cover the process. A nationally representative survey 
conducted by IPSOS Kenya two months after the election found that just over half of all 
respondents felt that they “mostly don’t understand” or “don’t understand at all” what 
happened during the process of vote counting, and that only a minority of Kenyans (49%) 
believed that the victorious candidate had “really won”. Thus, the use of new and improved 
digital processes did little to boost either the credibility of the polls, or public confidence in 
the legitimacy of the outcome. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the loss of 
transparency, which Yard argues often goes hand-in-hand with digitization,90 may have a 
particularly detrimental impact on public confidence once rigging is alleged.  
 Of course, technology does not always fail when introduced into difficult conditions, 
and there have been some less negative experiences in equally challenging circumstances, 
such as Nigeria in 2015. However, as we note above, the claims made for digital technology 
in that country have been overblown. Moreover, one reason that effectively rolling out new 
systems is particularly challenging in the Nigerian context is that the chair of the electoral 
commission does not actually control all relevant appointments. Instead, it is the president 
who determines the Resident Electoral Commissioners who play a significant role in 
coordinating elections at the state level.91 Given this, it is clear that even some of the less 
problematic cases demonstrate the significance of the quality of democracy, and the 
independence of key institutions, to the efficacy of digitization. 
 
 
Opportunity costs and the risk of complacency  
 
A final problem with the use of digital election technology is that when it is treated as a silver 
bullet, international donors and opposition parties may become complacent about the threat 
of rigging and pay less attention to other forms of detecting and deterring manipulation. This 
is particularly problematic given the potential for political interference to subvert the role of 
the electoral commission, and hence digital processes.92 Significantly, the great cost of new 
technology described above often means that there is less space in donor budgets to fund 
other projects. As a Democracy Reporting International report notes, while electronic voting 
machines cannot “prevent intimidation, vote buying, media bias, low participation by women, 
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the abuse of state resources by incumbent parties or endemic political and electoral violence 
. . . their enormous financial costs and the changes involved with their use . . . divert energies 
and funds from addressing these fundamental issues”.93  
In other words, digitizing elections carries an opportunity cost, rendering other 
options financially or practically unfeasible. As a result, alternative areas of investment, such 
as domestic observation groups, often find that their requests for more substantial financial 
assistance are denied. For example, when donors decided to fund an expensive digital voter 
registration process ahead of the DRC’s 2011 elections they simultaneously cut the number 
of international observers with the EU sending 112 to cover the entire country, down from 
the 300 observers that had been supported in 2006.94 While this correlation does not prove 
causation, the extent to which this pattern holds in a number of different countries is strongly 
suggestive. Moreover, donor representatives involved in electoral support work in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe told the authors that given a limited funding envelope, purchasing expensive 
equipment inevitably means they are forced to invest fewer resources in domestic 
observation unless there are exceptional reasons to increase the overall budget such as new 
democratic openings.95 This problem is not only a financial one, but also one of time and 
attention. Managing an election, or a donor project to support an election, is usually a 
stressful activity, with many things that must be done and not enough time to do them. In 
this context, introducing a new procurement process risks monopolizing the time and 
attention of a high number of officials within multiple organizations.  
The high opportunity costs of supporting digital technology are compounded by the 
tendency for election technology to engender a sense of complacency. The deep-seated belief 
in technology as a cure-all encourages an unwarranted degree of optimism in the likely quality 
of the polls. Ahead of the Kenyan elections of 2013, for example, the faith that opposition 
parties placed in technology went hand-in-hand with insufficient attention to the need to 
establish an effective system of party agents. After all, if technology can be relied upon to 
provide an effective check on the activities of the electoral commission, why go to the difficult 
and expensive task of building an effective party machine to duplicate the effort? Partly as a 
result, party leaders did not invest enough in internal party structures and failed to 
adequately monitor this process, with the result that a considerable portion of the funds was 
wasted when it was siphoned off by “middle men”.96 Along with other logistical challenges 
such as the need to coordinate across numerous coalition members and the difficulty of 
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locating agents in ruling party strongholds, this contributed to a situation in which the 
opposition did not place a party agent in over 10 per cent of polling stations.97  
The lack of attention and funding devoted to domestic monitors and party agents is 
particularly problematic if digital technology fails and electoral commissions revert back to 
manual processes. When this happens, opposition parties and donors often find that their 
focus on new technology has actually undermined their capacity to detect fraud. Following 
Kenya’s 2013 elections, for example, the opposition alleged that the technological failures 
were a deliberate strategy to facilitate the rigging of the election, but struggled to evidence 
this claim, in part due to the limited reach of its network of party agents.98  
Significantly, opposition parties were not the only ones to place most of their eggs in 
the technology basket; many international donors did likewise. In Kenya’s 2007 election, 
domestic and international monitoring had faced multiple challenges, but effectively 
highlighted a number of instances of electoral manipulation, which led to the European Union 
going public with its evidence. Despite this, and the danger posed by electoral controversy, 
the number of observers was reduced. This was publicly justified on the basis that a smaller 
team could be more coherent and organized – the 2007 monitoring process had often been 
chaotic – but was also shaped by the fact that a considerable portion of donor budgets was 
diverted to new technology. While precise figures are hard to come by, the EU has suggested 
that the Kenya Domestic Observers Forum was 17,000 strong on polling day in 2007, while 
only just over 7,000 were deployed by its replacement, the Elections Observation Group 
(ELOG) in 2013.99 In this way, the use of digital technology may lead to disinvestment in other 
areas that render elections more vulnerable to manipulation, not less. 
By contrast, the value of not relying on official digital technology was demonstrated 
by the Ghanaian general election of 2016. In the run-up to the elections, the opposition New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) had challenged the reliability of the register, arguing that non-citizens 
had been allowed to register. Concerned about the impartiality of the new Chairperson of the 
Electoral Commission, Charlotte Osei, the NPP kept up a barrage of criticism of the electoral 
management body. 100   As a result, the opposition party put extraordinary energy into 
recruiting and training agents and creating their own tallying system.101 This meant that as 
soon as the election was over the NPP was able to put together a full set of results – including 
photos of the “pink sheets” on which they were recorded at the polling station level. In the 
event, this evidence was not needed because the official results gave the NPP victory. 
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However, some opposition figures believe that it was the existence of their high quality 
parallel tally that prevented electoral manipulation.102 Whatever the truth of the matter, it is 
clear that by operating independently and creating a system that would have worked even if 
official processes had failed, the network of party agents established by the NPP generated a 
check on manipulation than was in some ways more robust than that offered by the electoral 
commission’s digital technology. 
 
 
The challenge of safeguarding elections in new democracies 
 
This article has documented some of drivers that account for the rise of official election 
technology in new democracies, and raised a number of questions about its effectiveness 
when it comes to generating better managed, more transparent and cleaner elections around 
the world. Against some more optimistic analyses,103 we have argued that although digital 
technologies have much to offer, they often fail to live up to expectations.  
On the one hand, even the most advanced forms of technology depend on human 
input to no lesser extent than manual election management and are in certain cases actually 
more vulnerable to manipulation. Significantly, this risk is exacerbated by the difficulty of 
monitoring “black box” digital processes, especially in counties in which the ruling party is 
able to exert control over the electoral commission. On the other hand, the procurement and 
operationalization of new equipment represents a major logistical task that many electoral 
commissions struggle to perform. The tendency for new technology to break down is 
particularly worrying given that the use of digital equipment tends to crowd out investment 
in other areas and can engender a sense of complacency. Consequently, when digital systems 
fail, opposition parties, monitors, and donors typically find that they have weak back-up 
systems at their disposal.  
It is tempting to conclude that the best way out of this conundrum is to simply do 
everything. International donors could, for example, support both digitization and an 
expansion of domestic election monitoring. However, this is unrealistic given the high costs 
of technology. Most new democracies now spend far more on holding elections than their 
Western counterparts, leaving few resources to be invested elsewhere. In the context of 
growing pressure on aid budgets, there appears to be little appetite to increase the budget 
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for electoral support enough to fund a broader range of activities. It is therefore important to 
either improve the chances that digital technologies will work, or to avoid using them.  
This conclusion should not be taken to imply that technology is bound to fail, or that 
there are no good arguments in favour of its deployment. As we have argued, biometric 
registration processes are less prone to breakdown because they take place over a longer 
period of time, and have helped to improve the electoral roll in a number of countries such 
as Nigeria and Kenya.104 We have also seen that digital processes may generate meaningful 
improvement in democratizing states when the electoral commission has achieved a greater 
degree of political independence and authority, and that the efficacy of new technology can 
improve over successive elections in more supportive political environments, such as Ghana. 
This suggests that digitizing elections may be more successful in regions in which neo-
patrimonial networks have done less damage to the autonomy of formal political 
institutions.105 It is also possible that further gains can be secured by varying parameters that 
we do not have the space to address in this paper, such as the modality through which digital 
processes are funded and managed. 
What our argument does call for is a serious re-think of the value added by digital 
technology, and the conditions required for it to work. The evidence thus far suggests that 
digital technologies are far less likely to deliver meaningful improvements in some of the 
competitive-authoritarian contexts in which they are most needed. Given this, digitizing 
elections should not be the default policy of opposition parties, civil society groups and 
international donors. Instead, more attention needs to be paid to the risk of failure given the 
political landscape in the country concerned. There are some early signs that this message is 
starting to be understood. For example, opposition parties have rejected the introduction of 
electronic voting machines in the DRC, arguing that they would simply be used to legitimate 
– and facilitate – rigging.106 Adopting this more sceptical approach systematically will involve 
all actors involved routinely asking a number of tough questions, and answering them 
honestly. Does the electoral commission have the logistical capacity and political 
independence to carry out such an operation? Can checks be put in place to minimise the risk 
of government manipulation? Does the local expertise exist to allow this process to be 
effectively monitored? Unless the answers to these kinds of questions are favourable, 
digitizing elections is likely to be at best a waste of resources and at worst a costly mistake: 
that is the digital dilemma facing democracy promoters. 
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